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Abstract
The paper examines preferences for product quality regulations. Our premise is that
preferences for product quality regulations derive from preferences for both private and
public goods. The model is used to explain public attitudes toward a referendum measure to
eliminate pesticide residues on food. Results from a survey of consumers are consistent with
the conceptual model and show that preferences for public goods inﬂuence support for the
product quality regulation. The results help explain why consumption behavior is a poor
predictor of political behavior, and have implications for methods that use voting and
market behavior to value public goods.
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1. Introduction
Product quality regulations have attracted considerable attention as a topic of
public concern and have emerged as a major policy question in the United States
and elsewhere. A prime example of this emphasis is the successful effort to secure
passage of the Food Quality Protection Act of 1996, legislation that addresses food

quality by, among other measures, reducing the amount of pesticide residue
allowed on fresh and processed foods.
Our premise is that product quality regulations can affect consumer welfare in
four ways. The most obvious effects of such regulations are to increase market
prices and to increase the provision of some desirable attribute of the product. For
example, product quality regulations are sometimes designed to reduce the
incidence of injury, as in the case of mandated safety standards such as childproof
caps on medication, protective packaging, infant car seats, ﬂame-retardant fabric,
and airbag requirements. These interventions reduce risk and increase the
consumer’s level of health.
Third, product quality regulation may provide afﬁliated public goods. These
public goods are especially affected by regulations directed at production methods.
For example, a regulation that requires tuna to be caught in a ‘dolphin-safe’
manner enhances environmental quality. Altruism may also be important in
product quality decisions, as evidenced by the recent effort by manufacturers such
as Nike, Reebok and K-Mart to ensure consumers that their products are made
without the use of child or sweatshop labor.1 Indeed, product quality regulation
need not have any effect on consumptive characteristics at all: for instance,
‘dolphin-safe’ tuna tastes no different than conventional tuna, but may be more
valued by consumers nonetheless.
Finally, product quality regulation that restricts choice in the marketplace can
result in a loss of options to consumers. Product quality regulations tend to change
slowly over time — once enacted, they are unlikely to be repealed anytime soon
since the transaction costs of legislation and implementation of law are high. Thus,
if the government regulates product quality in a way that reduces choice, there is a
loss of freedom, which is a public good itself, since it cannot be denied to any
consumer and is enjoyed by all consumers simultaneously (Cooter, 2000). In the
case considered in this paper, regulating that all food be produced without
pesticides constrains choice now and in the future since both conventional and
organic produce are available currently in the market. Even a consumer with a
high valuation of the attribute ‘pesticide-free’ will dislike the loss of future
options.
This paper examines preferences for product quality regulations that involve the
joint production of private and public goods. We consider the case of food safety
regulation, as mandated by the Food Quality Protection Act (FQPA) of 1996, in
which a mandated reduction in the use of agricultural pesticides increases the price
of food, reduces individual health risk, reduces option value and enhances
environmental quality. Our ﬁndings direct attention to the fact that public attitudes
toward product quality regulations may derive from attitudes about both private
and public goods.
1
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We focus on pesticide regulation because its joint production nature is
exceptionally clear. The majority of the public is aware of both the connections
between pesticide residues and personal health and between pesticide use and
environmental quality. It is well known that pesticide residues, particularly on
fresh fruits and vegetables, pose health risks from cancer and other illnesses, and
consumers are familiar with making market choices about the level of pesticide
risk to which they and their families are exposed. At the same time, the adverse
consequences of chemical inputs such as pesticides and fertilizers on ﬁsh and
wildlife populations has been widely recognized since at least the publication of
Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring.
Working with a detailed in-person survey of consumers, we ﬁrst characterize
willingness to pay for an absence of pesticide residues on food, then examine
support for government regulation of pesticide residues. A striking feature of the
raw survey results, which is conﬁrmed by more thorough econometric analysis, is
that some individuals are not willing to pay a premium for pesticide-free food, but
nonetheless support a ban on the use of pesticides in agriculture. This seemingly
paradoxical result is explained by the fact that food quality regulation jointly
produces both private and public goods: an individual with a strong preference for
environmental quality but with little concern for personal health risk posed by
pesticide exposure may well favor regulation of pesticide residues.
Another ﬁnding of the empirical analysis is that many individuals do not support
the pesticide regulation even though they express a high willingness to pay for the
absence of pesticide residues on their food. This result indicates that freedom of
choice is also important, and that some consumers highly value preserving their
future choices. In the status quo, these consumers are able to avoid pesticide
residues by consuming organic produce. For them, the main beneﬁt of the
pesticide regulation is that consumption of pesticide-free food does nothing to
change the level of environmental quality since one individual’s impact on the
total amount of pesticide use is miniscule. Thus, the regulation increases the level
of one public good (environmental quality) but decreases the level of another
(future freedom of choice).
The ﬁnding that joint production of public and private goods is a salient feature
of product quality regulation raises the interesting possibility that individuals may
support such interventions through voting or other means even though their
consumption behavior suggests otherwise. This follows for two reasons. An
individual may have a low willingness to pay for pesticide-free food, but care
deeply about the environment. This voter may support the regulation even though
she did not consume organic produce. Alternatively, a consumer may have a high
willingness to pay for an absence of pesticide residues, but place a high option
value on retaining future choices. This consumer may oppose the ban even though
she has a track record of paying a premium for pesticide-free food, and may even
have a high level of concern for the environment. Thus, referendum behavior may

be a poor predictor of willingness to pay, and consumption behavior may be a poor
predictor of support for public policies that change product quality.
The observation that consumption behavior may differ markedly from political
behavior has implications for the use of techniques that infer the value of public
interventions from consumer choices, and for methods that attempt to value public
goods by examining referendum behavior. A common method employed in the
environmental economics literature is to value regulations by examining consumer
expenditures on avoidance goods, as in Blomquist (1979), Dardis (1980),
Atkinson and Halvorsen (1990) and Dickie and Gerking (1997).2 For example, the
value of a policy to reduce the incidence of skin cancer by strengthening the ozone
layer might be deduced by aggregating expenditures on sunscreen, hats and other
avoidance goods. Such a technique does not adequately address support for the
regulation, since the public act of strengthening the ozone layer may have other
effects. If the ozone layer is protected by reducing emissions of harmful chemicals,
then there might be environmental quality improvements that are afﬁliated with the
regulation, but not with the purchase of avoidance goods. Thus, using market
choices to value the effect of protecting the ozone layer will misestimate the true
level of support for the intervention. Similarly, it is clear from our estimation
results that one would obtain a biased measure of the value of the FQPA by
examining only market-based preferences for pesticide-free food.3
The remainder of the paper in structured as follows. Section 2 develops a simple
model of consumer preferences regarding market and voting choices for food
quality in the context of pesticide residue avoidance. Section 3 describes our data
and empirical methods. Section 4 presents estimation results from a survey of
consumer preferences for pesticide reductions, and, in Section 5, concluding
comments are provided.

2. The value of food quality regulations: private and public goods
The following model frames our study of individual preferences toward food
quality regulations, and how these preferences compare to consumption behavior.
Suppose an individual has an indirect utility function comprised of the following
arguments: food prices (P), health (H ), environmental quality (N), and freedom of
choice in consumption (F ). For analytic convenience, all other arguments in the
2
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that regulations can jointly provide public and private goods.
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The same argument can be made about so-called ‘travel cost’ methods that measure the value of
protecting some natural resource by the amount of money expended by individuals to recreate there.
Again, government action to preserve a natural resource changes prices (and taxes), provides
recreational opportunities, affects the level of environmental quality and constrains future choices.

utility function are treated as exogenous factors and suppressed. These three
arguments comprise a simple theoretical framework that nests an individual’s
willingness to pay (WTP) for food quality in a broader model of preferences for
food quality regulation.
Let DP *i denote individual i’s willingness to pay for the elimination of dietary
pesticide residues, which we deﬁne as the value of the concomitant increase in
health from a status quo level, H 0i , to an augmented level, H 1i . Normalizing initial
food prices to one, this deﬁnition allows the WTP of an individual to be
characterized as the solution to
Vi (H i1 , 1 1 DP *i , F 0 , N 0 ) 5Vi (H i0 , 1, F 0 , N 0 ),

(1)

where Vi ( ? ) is the indirect utility function of individual i and F 0 and N 0 are the
status quo levels of option value and environmental quality. A linear approximation of the indirect utility function, evaluated at the indifference point deﬁned
by (1), yields
VH
DP i* 5 2 ] DHi ,
VP

(2)

where DHi 5 H 1i 2 H 0i denotes the health beneﬁt gained by individual i from
eliminating pesticide residues in food consumption, and where VH and VP denote
the marginal utility of health and the marginal utility of the price change,
respectively. In (2), WTP depends on the perceived change in health from avoiding
pesticide residues by consuming pesticide-free food, and on the scaling of this
health effect by the ratio of marginal utilities of health and income.
Now, consider an individual’s preference for a public policy eliminating
pesticide residues on food. Food quality regulation that bans the use of pesticides
may have four major effects on an individual: an income effect associated with the
resulting change in food expenditure, a health effect gained through the elimination of pesticide residues on food, a loss of future consumption choices which
implies a loss of option value, and an environmental quality effect from reduced
chemical use in agriculture. Let N 1 denote the augmented state of environmental
quality following a ban on pesticide use, let F 1 denote the reduced range of future
consumption choices, and let DPi denote the percentage change in food prices for
individual i as a result of the pesticide ban. Note that DPi can differ from WTP,
DP *i , as deﬁned in (2).
Now consider the voting decision on a referendum to ban pesticide use in
agriculture. To begin, suppose that each individual votes for the proposal that
gives the highest level of utility.4 Individual i then favors a referendum to ban the
use of pesticides if the utility level associated with a ban, Vi (H i1 , 1 1 DPi , F 1 , N 1 ),
4

The conceptual underpinnings of this approach are discussed by Deacon and Shapiro (1975).

is above that of the status quo, Vi (H i0 , 1, F 0 , N 0 ), and otherwise votes against such
regulation. We can express the change in utility from the public policy by taking a
linear expansion of indirect utility about the status quo equilibrium as follows:
dVi 5VH DHi 1VP DPi 1VF DF 1VN DN
1

(3)

0

where DN 5 N 2 N denotes the change in environmental quality that results
from a decreased incidence of chemical use in food production, and DF 5 F 1 2
F 0 , 0 is the loss of consumption options.
Upon substitution of from (2), a manipulation of (3) results in

H

J

VF
VN
dVi 5 2VP DP i* 2 DPi 2 ] DF 2 ] DN .
VP
VP

(4)

In (4), the utility of individual i increases with WTP for pesticide-free products
and with the marginal utility of environmental quality, but decreases with the
percentage change in food prices following the ban on pesticide use and decreases
with the restriction on future consumption choices. Whether an individual supports
or opposes the ban depends on the interplay of these factors.
If WTP exceeds the increased market price of food following the pesticide ban,
then an individual will vote for the ban so long the value of lost freedom in
consumption (VF DF ) does not more than offset his value of the environmental
quality improvement (VN DN). In general, an individual will vote for the ban so
long as VP (DPi 2 DP *i ) 1VF DF 1VN DN $ 0. Thus, even an individual who
values pesticide-free food less than the increase in expenditure required to
purchase it (i.e., DPi 2 DP *i $ 0) may still vote for the pesticide ban so long as her
valuation of the afﬁliated change in environmental quality, or VN DN, is sufﬁciently
large. Conversely, an individual who does value pesticide-free food more than the
increase in expenditure needed to purchase it will oppose the regulation if her
valuation of preserving freedom of choices, or 2VF DF, is sufﬁciently high.
An implication of this framework is that consumption behavior and voting
behavior may be quite different. An individual will choose to purchase pesticidefree food whenever DPi 2 DP *i # 0. Substituting for DP *i as deﬁned by (2), it
follows that an individual will consume pesticide-free food when 2VP DPi 2VH
DHi , 0. As for the voting decision, it follows from the expression for the change
in indirect utility associated with the pesticide ban that an individual will
experience an increase in utility if 2VP DPi 2VH DHi #VN DN 1VF DF.
Comparing these two expressions, we see that some individuals may choose not to
consume pesticide-free food, but will still vote to ban the use of pesticides in
agriculture. Thus, WTP and referendum choices are not the same, and individuals’
market and political behavior may differ depending on their characteristics.
This basic framework can be applied to other product quality regulations.
Consider the case of a regulation on production methods such a prohibition on
child labor or on incidental killing of dolphins to harvest tuna. In this situation, the

market price of the good will increase following a ban on the offensive production
technique, future options will shrink, and the level of some public good will
increase (e.g., child welfare or the level of the dolphin population). Note, however,
that the regulation will not affect a private good analogous to health in the
pesticide example (i.e., DHi 5 0). That is, the ‘regulated’ product is identical to the
original product from the consumer’s point of view. In this case, individuals would
not freely consume a product produced by an alternative method due to the
free-rider problem because they perceive that their consumption choices have no
effect on the level of provision of the public good.
However, as long as an individual values freedom and the afﬁliated public good
(i.e., as long as VF DF 1VN DN $ 0), then they may well vote for the ban on the
offensive production technique. In particular, an individual will favor the ban
whenever 2VP DPi #VF DF 1VN DN.
Conversely, if there is no public good impact associated with a product quality
regulation, then DN50 in (4). In this case, voting choices may be even more
different than market choices since the regulation involves the loss of one public
good (future consumption choices) without the offsetting increase in another
(environmental quality). Not surprisingly, such referenda are rare, since the market
provides an efﬁcient amount of the desirable product quality and public intervention is not needed.

3. Empirical analysis
The conceptual model of Eqs. (2) and (4) can be expressed in the following
recursive form that is convenient for estimation:
WTPi 5 a 1 b Xi 1 ´i

(5)

Vote i 5 g 1 d WTPi 1 f Yi 1 hi ,

(6)

Estimation of the voting equation must account for the fact that WTP is
endogenous. It is also informative to compare the coefﬁcients between the two
regressions to see how demographic factors affect WTP and voting.
Eq. (5) is based on the assumption that WTPi is a linear function of exogenous
variables, Xi . These variables are primarily household, demographic and ethnic
characteristics that may inﬂuence voting. The coefﬁcients a and b are unknown,
and ´i is an error term. Following Eq. (4), the estimated voting Eq. (6) supposes
that an individual’s preference for a ban on pesticide use is a function of the utility
difference between alternatives.
Exogenous factors, denoted as Yi , and stated WTP are hypothesized to explain
voting choices. Included in the matrix Yi is an individual’s stated level of concern

for the environment, which is a public good affected by pesticide use.5 Personal
characteristics are also related to attitudes about government restriction of choice.
The effect of variation in option value is embedded in the coefﬁcients on
exogenous factors. The parameters g, d and f are unknown and is an error term.
Estimation of the WTP Eq. (5) is carried out using standard, left-censored Tobit
since responses are truncated at 0. Estimation of the voting Eq. (6) must account
for the fact that WTP is endogenous. To estimate the parameters of the voting
equation, we use Probit with instrumental variables (Maddala, 1983); estimated
WTP from (5) is used as the instrument.6 Identiﬁcation is ensured since some
explanatory variables are excluded from the voting equation. We describe the data
and choice of regressors shortly.
The data requirements of this model pose another problem: how an individual
votes on a particular food quality regulation is private information. Consequently,
we derive our sample from survey data. The sampling frame is comprised of
residents of the Greater Bay Area and Central Valley of California, an area where
consumers have experience with voting on food quality and environmental quality
regulations. A total of 233 in-person surveys were conducted at supermarket
produce counters. To reﬂect the bilingual nature of many Bay Area cities, 10% of
the surveys were administered in Spanish. Each individual was asked to state his
or her WTP for pesticide-free food and to describe how he or she would vote on a
referendum measure to ban the use of pesticides to produce food. Interviewers also
collected information on household demographics and food consumption patterns.
Nearly all of the 17 survey locations represented in our sample (including major
chains — especially Safeway, which dominates the local market) offer both
conventional and organic produce, and pesticide-free food is also available from
specialty stores and farmers’ markets. The notion of pesticide-free food is quite
real to most food shoppers, and those in our sample had the opportunity to observe
actual price differentials between conventional and organic produce. Since these
price differentials should be representative of the price impacts of the pesticide
ban, it is reasonable to assume that consumers have informed perceptions about the
cost of the referendum.
The survey collected information on various individual and household characteristics. Respondents were queried about whether they would vote for a
referendum measure to ban pesticide use in agriculture, and also about their
willingness to pay to avoid pesticide residues on food (i.e., WTP for pesticide-free
food). WTP is expressed in percentage terms (e.g., a percentage increase in food
prices). These dependent variables were regressed on a collection of variables
representing household characteristics and consumption behavior.
Respondents were asked to state their level of concern for the environment,
5

This utility-difference framework for estimating a voting equation is similar to that of Deacon and
Shapiro (1975), Bergstrom et al. (1988) and Hoyt and Lee (1998).
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ˆ i 5 â 1 bˆ Xi , is used as the instrument.
Uncorrected WTP, or WTP

which we measure as a discrete (0 / 1) variable. Educational attainment was also
measured as a dummy variable: respondents were asked if anyone in their
household had attained a 4-year college degree. Smoking has well-documented
health effects, and we therefore asked respondents how many packs of cigarettes
they consumed per day.
Next, survey respondents were asked how many children were living in the
household, if any. They were also asked to report their household’s weekly food
expenditure. This variable was measured continuously, and respondents were
asked to report only expenditure on food prepared at home (i.e., bought from a
store and consumed at home) and to exclude expenditures on meals eaten away
from home. Respondents were also asked about their level of household income.
We asked respondents to report income in ranges to reﬂect the fact that most
individuals do not have precise information on their level of household income,
and also to avoid being too invasive. Income was grouped into three classes (low,
medium and high) and measured by two dummy variables (one for low income
and one for high income). Low income was considered to be a household income
of less than $20 000, and high income was considered to be an income of more
than $50 000.
Finally, we asked respondents to state which racial group they most identify
with (Caucasian, African-American, Latino, Asian-American or Other). Results
were measured by a set of discrete variables, with Caucasian being the reference
group. Respondents were also asked to state their gender. Male was chosen as the
reference group, so women were given a value of 1 for this variable.
Of those surveyed, 40.34% were in favor of the proposed pesticide regulation, a
ﬁnding that is consistent with the results of California’s Proposition 128 initiative
in 1990 where nearly 40% of the population voted to prohibit the use of broad
classes of pesticides in agriculture. Fig. 1 compares the frequency distribution of
WTP responses among individuals who voted for the pesticide ban to that among

Fig. 1. WTP responses for subgroups voting for and against the proposed ban.

individuals who unfavorably viewed the proposal. Generally, those consumers
expressing support for the ban had a higher percent willingness to pay for
pesticide-free food. However, one interesting result from this graphical analysis is
that some individuals expressed support for the referendum measure but stated no
willingness to pay for pesticide-free food. While not conclusive, this evidence
suggests that, to some individuals at least, voting is perceived to affect more than
just product quality.
Another signiﬁcant result, which follows directly from Fig. 1, is that some
individuals expressed high WTP for pesticide-free food, but still opposed the
pesticide ban. This observation is consistent with our premise that consumers
value preserving their freedom of choice. Their reasoning may be option-theoretic.
That is, consumers may understand that regulation changes slowly, and realize that
even if they are willing to pay to consume entirely organic produce today, that
they may wish to make other choices in the future. Or, some consumers could
simply resent government intrusion into this aspect of their lives.
Table 1 shows the correlation matrix for the voting preference on pesticide
regulation (where a favorable response takes unitary value), the expressed WTP to
avoid pesticide residues in food consumption, and the various exogenous decision
factors employed in the model. Notice that the correlation between WTP to
eliminate pesticide residues on food and a favorable vote on pesticide regulation is
positive, but small relative to the correlation between voting choice and other
variables. A favorable view of a pesticide ban is more strongly correlated with
children in a household and with environmental concern than with WTP for
eliminating pesticide residues on food.
Not surprisingly, income is signiﬁcantly related to environmental concern in the
sample, as low (high) income respondents view environmental protection to be
less (more) important than do middle income individuals. In addition, there is a
positive correlation between children in a household and concern for the
environment, which is consistent with the bequest motives associated with
environmental preservation.
The education level of the highest-educated household member is positively
correlated with household income, but negatively correlated with children in the
household. There is also a strong negative correlation between education and
cigarette consumption, which is consistent with the ﬁnding of Kenkel (1990) that
educational attainment has a positive inﬂuence on personal health.
Interestingly, the majority of demographic factors in Table 1 inﬂuence WTP and
voting behavior in an opposing fashion. For example, education is negatively
correlated with a favorable vote on pesticide regulation but positively correlated
with WTP, and children in a household is positively correlated with a preference to
ban pesticides but negatively correlated with WTP. Household income below a
baseline middle-income level is positively correlated with a favorable view of
pesticide regulation but negatively correlated with WTP, with the converse holding
for relatively high-income households.

Table 1
Regressor correlation matrix

Ban
WTP
Environment
Education
Smoking
Children
Exposure
Female
Black
Latino
Asian
Other
Low income
High income

Ban

WTP

1
0.17
0.23
20.07
20.10
0.24
0.18
0.19
0.17
0.08
20.16
0.11
0.04
20.02

1
0.14
0.19
20.18
20.10
20.18
0.16
0.13
20.15
0.01
0.08
20.13
0.09

Environment

Education

1
0.12
20.25
0.12
0.07
0.26
20.05
20.17
0.01
0.12
20.06
0.13

1
20.25
20.06
20.05
0.11
20.22
20.21
0.09
20.04
20.22
0.41

Smoking

Children

Exposure

Female

Black

Latino

Asian

Other

1
20.03
0.04
0.26
20.05
0.09
0.06
20.02
0.09
20.16

1
0.52
0.07
0.05
0.13
20.04
0.07
20.04
0.07

1
0.06
20.03
0.17
20.12
0.11
20.15
0.06

1
20.13
20.07
0.01
20.04
20.05
0.07

1
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
0.17
20.12

1
n.a.
n.a.
0.14
20.21

1
n.a.
20.03
0.05

1
0.09
20.12

Low
income

High
income

1
n.a.

1

4. Results

4.1. Willingness to pay
Results of the Tobit estimation of (5) are presented in the ﬁrst column of Table
2. Education, gender, low income, and African-American and ‘other’ ethnicity are
positively associated with stated percent willingness to pay for the food quality
attribute ‘pesticide-free’ at conventional levels of signiﬁcance. Household food
expenditure, low income and cigarette consumption are negatively associated with
WTP.
The sign of the coefﬁcient on the low-income group conforms to the predicted
relationship, as marginal utility of income inﬂuences WTP inversely in (2).
Expression (2) also indicates that high-income respondents have greater WTP. The
lack of signiﬁcance of this coefﬁcient is not particularly surprising, however, given
the diminishing marginal utility of income. The negative sign of the coefﬁcient on
household food expenditure suggests that WTP is concave with respect to
household food expenditure.
The coefﬁcient on children is negative, but insigniﬁcant. This result may seem
surprising in light of the recent evidence that indicates greater sensitivity to
pesticide residues among children than adults (see National Academy of Sciences,
1993), but is explained by several countervailing factors. Life-cycle models of
health demand (for example, Arthur, 1981; Cropper and Sussman, 1988) ﬁnd age
to be a theoretically important determinant of WTP that decreases the value of
avoiding long-term health risks, a result that suggests a positive association
between children in a household and WTP. Individuals with children purchase
food for members of a household that are younger, on average, than in households
without children. However, per capita income also declines in the sample as family
size increases, which tends to make pesticide-free produce relatively more
expensive for larger households. Cropper and Sussman (1988) also ﬁnd families
with children to have signiﬁcantly higher discount rates, which would reduce the
costs associated with long-term decrements in health.
Not surprisingly, the coefﬁcient on cigarette consumption is negative and
signiﬁcant in the WTP equation. The consumption of cigarettes is likely to be
inversely related to the perceived change in health from reduced exposure to
pesticide residues and may also indicate a greater willingness to accept latent
health hazards. The long-term health effect associated with the elimination of
pesticide residues may be perceived as having only limited effectiveness for
individuals not supplementing health in other dimensions. The sign and signiﬁcance of this coefﬁcient indicates that personal health motivations are an important
determinant of an individual’s willingness to pay to eliminate pesticide residues on
food.
Education is linked to greater percent willingness to pay for pesticide-free food.
This ﬁnding suggests that educated individuals may more adequately realize causal
links between pesticide residues and latent health effects. Education has been

Table 2
Estimation results
WTP

Vote

Intercept

0.0174
0.5310

22.9707*
0.6833

Children

20.0001
0.0173

0.4664*
0.2153

Household food
expenditure

20.0004*
0.0002

0.0021
0.0022

Education

0.0453*
0.0166

20.0921
0.2111

Concern for
environment

0.0178
0.0114

0.3890*
0.1442

Female

0.0298*
0.0151

0.3978*
0.1925

Black

0.0793*
0.0198

0.5668*
0.2491

Asian

0.0199
0.0215

Latino

0.0203
0.0261

0.6683*
0.3153

Other

0.0909*
0.039

0.4849
0.4673

Low income

20.0581*
0.0186

0.1289
0.2367

High income

20.0015
0.0191

Smoking

20.0383*
0.0176

20.4351
0.2878

20.0103
0.2416

WTP
Scale
Log likelihood
Observations
% Correct

2.5058*
0.9431
0.1068
0.0054
134.41
233

2130.68
233
78

*Signiﬁcance at the 5% level or below.

found to be signiﬁcantly related to health-improving activities in a number of other
studies.7
7

In addition to the Kenkel study cited earlier, Blomquist (1979) found that individuals with college
education are more likely to engage in precautionary behavior (i.e., wearing seat belts) to avoid injury
in automobile accidents.

Basic demographic factors are also systematically related to WTP. There is a
strong relationship between gender, ethnicity and the stated value of avoiding
pesticide residues. On average, women in the sample have a higher willingness to
pay than men do, and African-Americans and members of the ‘other’ ethnic group
have a higher WTP than Caucasians. Similar relationships between ethnic
identiﬁcation, gender and willingness to pay to avoid health risks have been
documented in other economic studies (Blomquist, 1979; Viscusi et al., 1988;
Krupnick and Cropper, 1992).
Finally, it is interesting to note that the coefﬁcient on environmental concern
was insigniﬁcant in the WTP regression. This ﬁnding indicates that individuals
understand the distinction between their personal consumption choices and the
provision of environmental quality. In the uncorrected correlation analysis,
environmental concern is somewhat correlated with WTP. However, this relationship becomes insigniﬁcant after controlling for consumption behavior and demographic characteristics. Willingness to pay for pesticide-free food appears to be a
based on an individual’s valuation of personal health rather than a statement about
the importance of the environment. In this sense, individuals understand that
purchasing pesticide-free produce is not a political act.

4.2. Voting behavior
The second column of Table 2 reports the estimates of Eq. (6). Overall, the
discrete choice model ﬁts the data well, correctly classifying over 77% of the
responses. Children, environmental concern, gender, African-American ethnicity
and willingness to pay for pesticide-free food increase the likelihood of support for
the pesticide regulation; the coefﬁcients on these variables are all signiﬁcant at the
5% level.8 Smoking is excluded from the voting equation for two reasons. From a
theoretical point of view, in Eq. (4), the utility difference from the pesticide ban
does not include VH or DHi , which are the primary factors in the model that are
inﬂuenced by smoking, since health effects are subsumed in WTP. From a practical
point of view, excluding smoking from the voting equation also ensures identiﬁcation of (6).9
As predicted by the conceptual model, willingness to pay to avoid pesticide
residues is positively associated with a willingness to support the pesticide
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Note that the intercept is also negative and signiﬁcant. Part of this coefﬁcient may reﬂect voters’
dislike for restrictions on freedom of choice in the marketplace.
9
¨
It should be noted that a in ‘naıve’
regression estimating voting as a function of all variables, the
coefﬁcient on smoking was insigniﬁcant, having a P value of 0.5. If individuals who smoke not only
place lower values on consumption of pesticide-free food, but also have different views of the value of
a clean environment, than their non-smoking neighbors, then the smoking variable may not be a valid
instrument.

regulation, and is highly signiﬁcant. Thus, individual valuation of the food-quality
attribute ‘pesticide-free’ clearly inﬂuences the voting decision.
The coefﬁcient on WTP is not the only signiﬁcant variable in the estimated
voting choice equation, however. This ﬁnding suggests that, as expected, private
valuations of food quality improvements do not completely determine individual
preferences for food quality regulation. As predicted by the conceptual model,
stated level of concern for the environment increases the likelihood that an
individual will support the pesticide ban. The incentive to provide public goods
such as environmental quality through collective choices appears to be an
important source of value of food quality regulations. Further, it is important, and
consistent with the theoretical model, that environmental concern was insigniﬁcant
in the WTP equation, but highly signiﬁcant in the voting equation. This ﬁnding
clearly supports the hypothesis that different factors inﬂuence the consumption and
voting decisions.
Concern for the environment raises the amount that an individual would be
willing to pay for product quality regulation above and beyond the value of the
private beneﬁts from the regulation. To quantify this effect, note that the estimated
coefﬁcients imply that a 1% increase in WTP increases the likelihood of voting for
the referendum by 2.5%. Since a high level of environmental concern increases the
likelihood of supporting the referendum by 39%, then the impact of concern for
environmental quality is equivalent to a 16% increase in WTP for pesticide-free
food (0.39 / 0.025516). These estimates suggest that environmental-leaning individuals value the regulation by 16% times their food expenditure because of the
environmental effect alone. This amount must be added to the amount of WTP to
obtain a true measure of the value of the regulation.10
As in the WTP equation, demographic characteristics also inﬂuence the voting
decision.11 For example, the number of children in the household is signiﬁcantly
related to support for the referendum. This ﬁnding is consistent with the bequest
motive for environmental concern since individuals may wish their children to
inherit a high level of environmental quality. Similar ﬁndings related to the
inﬂuence of children on valuation have been reported by Cropper and Sussman
(1988), among others.
Latino ethnicity is positively associated with a favorable view of pesticide
10
Future research should attempt to obtain explicit estimates of the effect of preferences for
unrestricted choice on preferences for the regulation.
11
The working assumption behind the survey and the econometric model is that all individuals in the
sample would observe the same price changes resulting from the pesticide regulation, and thus DPi
would be the same for all individuals. However, it is possible that even though market prices will be
the same for all consumers after the pesticide ban, individuals may have different perceptions of the
impacts of the ban ex ante. These perceptual differences may be embedded in the demographic and
consumption variables in the coefﬁcients. It is difﬁcult to explain why women or African-Americans,
for example, would expect lower price impacts of the regulation (and thus higher propensity to vote for
the ban) than would other groups. Nonetheless, this effect may partly explain the pattern of estimates.

regulation, but is an insigniﬁcant determinant of WTP. The proclivity of Latino
respondents to favor pesticide controls is interesting, especially since Latino
ethnicity and environmental concern are negatively correlated in Table 1. It is
possible that this ﬁnding reﬂects the fact that the vast majority of farm workers in
California (who are routinely exposed to pesticides, as described in Sunding and
Zivin (2000)) are from Mexico and other Latin American countries. Latino
respondents in the San Francisco Bay Area may identify with this group of
workers, either because they themselves have worked in agriculture, or because
they have friends and relatives employed there. Thus, the positive coefﬁcient may
suggest that the provision of other public goods such as the welfare of ﬁeld
workers may be important when considering preferences toward pesticide regulations. We do not press the point here, because we have only the most fragmentary
data on these relationships, but Latino respondents may be more sensitive to
worker safety issues in agricultural production than are other ethnic groups.
Viscusi et al. (1988) have documented the existence of similar altruism effects
with respect to other risk reduction measures.
Household income level does not inﬂuence the voting decision, independent of
the other explanatory variables. Both income coefﬁcients are insigniﬁcant,
although they are of opposite sign. Interestingly, income does have a systematic
effect on WTP, as demonstrated by the estimation of (5). This is evidence, albeit
indirect, that different factors are at play in the consumption and voting decisions.
Similarly, household food expenditures are negatively associated with WTP, but
have an insigniﬁcant relationship to support for the referendum.

5. Conclusion
The paper explores the factors determining support for public policies that
regulate the level of product quality. Our main hypothesis is that product quality
regulations can affect consumer welfare in four ways: by increasing market price,
by increasing the provision of some desirable attribute of the product, by
restricting consumer freedom and by affecting the provision of other, afﬁliated
public goods. For example, regulation that requires imported tuna to be ‘dolphinsafe’ enhances the dolphin population and the promotion of ‘free-range’ poultry or
cosmetics that are not tested on animals reduces the incidence of animal cruelty.
Even the recent effort by manufacturers such as Nike, Reebok and K-Mart to
ensure consumers that their products are made without the use of child or
sweatshop labor affects the level of public goods.
The paper develops a conceptual model of product quality regulations that
includes impacts on public goods (in particular the range of consumer choice and
environmental quality), and applies the framework to the case of the Food Quality
Protection Act of 1996 that limits allowable levels of pesticides on food by
restriction the use of pesticides in agriculture. This regulation will change relative

prices, improve food safety and provide public goods in the form of enhanced ﬁsh
and wildlife populations.
An interesting implication of this framework is that consumption behavior and
voting behavior may be quite different. In particular, an individual may rationally
express no WTP for pesticide-free food, but still express support for a referendum
measure banning pesticide use. Personal consumption choices do not inﬂuence the
level of public goods since an individual has a miniscule effect in the market.
However, a public policy to ban pesticide use will inﬂuence environmental quality,
and if the individual cares enough about this public good, then she may support the
pesticide ban even if her WTP for pesticide-free food is less than the actual price
difference between conventional and organic produce. Thus, WTP and referendum
choices are not the same, and individuals’ market and political behavior may differ
depending on their personal characteristics.
Further, an individual may express high WTP for pesticide-free food and a high
level of concern for the environment, both factors that would tend to predict
support for the regulation, yet still oppose the referendum if they dislike longlasting restrictions on consumption choices. That is, even individuals who have
‘green’ proclivities may still oppose the ban if they resent the government limiting
their future options.
An econometric model is speciﬁed to estimate support for the pesticide ban,
taking account of the fact that WTP for pesticide-free food is endogenous.
Estimation is carried out using data from a survey of food shoppers in the Greater
San Francisco Bay Area. Each individual was asked to state his or her WTP for
pesticide-free food and to describe how he or she would vote on a referendum
measure to ban the use of pesticides to produce food. Interviewers also collected
information on household characteristics and food consumption patterns.
Results of the WTP estimation are consistent with the conceptual model, and
with the ﬁndings of other studies of avoidance expenditures. Education, gender,
low income, and African-American and ‘other’ ethnicity are positively associated
with WTP for the food quality attribute ‘pesticide-free’ at conventional levels of
signiﬁcance. Household food expenditure, low income and cigarette consumption
are negatively associated with WTP.
As predicted by the conceptual model, willingness to pay to avoid pesticide
residues is positively associated with a willingness to support the pesticide
regulation, and is highly signiﬁcant. Thus, individual valuation of the food-quality
attribute ‘pesticide-free’ clearly inﬂuences the voting decision. The coefﬁcient on
WTP is not the only signiﬁcant variable in the estimated voting choice equation,
however, and private valuations of food quality improvements do not completely
determine individual preferences for food quality regulation. As predicted by the
conceptual model, a high level of concern for the environment increases the
likelihood that an individual will support the pesticide ban. The incentive to
provide public goods such as environmental quality through collective choices is
an important source of value of the pesticide regulation.

Our study provides evidence that a potentially signiﬁcant disparity exists
between the value of marketable attributes of product quality and the value of
product quality regulations. Support for a referendum measure is a poor proxy of
willingness to pay, and a poor measure of the value of the afﬁliated public good of
environmental quality. Thus, care must be exercised in attempts to infer the value
of risk-reduction policies from private aversion activities or other individual
actions. Consumer preferences for product quality regulations may reﬂect not only
the value of these private beneﬁts, but also the additional beneﬁts associated with
the provision of public goods. Similarly, care must also be exercised when
attempting to infer the value of public goods from referendum choices since public
action may affect the level of public goods as well as ones that can be provided by
the market.
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